This paper takes it as a premise that a distinction between matters of fact and of law is important in the causal inquiry. But it argues that separating factual and legal causation as different elements of liability is not the best way to implement the fact/law distinction. It is partly a legal question what counts as a cause-in-fact; and certain liabilitylimiting doctrines under the umbrella of "legal causation" depend on the application of factual-causal concepts. The contrastive account of factual causation proposed in this paper improves matters. This account more clearly distinguishes matters of fact from matters of law within the cause-in-fact inquiry. It also extends the scope of cause-in-fact to answer some questions currently answered by certain doctrines of legal causation -doctrines which, it is argued, are more naturally seen as applications of our ordinary causal concept than as non-causal liabilitylimiting devices.
In this section I present an argument to the effect that satisfaction of the element of legal liability known as factual causation cannot be a purely factual matter: the law plays a crucial role. The problem is not the general doubt previously alluded to, as to whether fact and law can ever be distinguished. Rather, it arises from the particular difficulty of saying what causation is, which necessitates the involvement of legal devices in resolving certain awkward causal puzzles.
Let us use the term purist for somebody who thinks that the fact/law distinction ought to be implemented in the causal inquiry by distinguishing a purely factual-causal element of liability. We have already mentioned Richard Wright, who is an obvious example of a purist. Naturally enough, Wright reasons that without a clear account of factual causation, confusion is bound to follow, and has actually beset some legal theorists (such as Wex Malone, H.L.A. Hart and Tony Honoré). Accordingly, Wright's strategy is to provide a clear account of factual causation. According to Wright's NESS account of causation (and hence of the cause-in-fact element of liability), a cause is a necessary part of a sufficient condition for its effect, with no presumption that the cause should be sufficient or that the sufficient condition should be necessary. The debt to the philosopher Jonathan Mackie's INUS account of causation in the objects is obvious. My second doubt about Wright's approach concerns the central idea that an element of legal liability can consist purely in a causal fact. On closer inspection, making sense of this claim proves tricky. There seem to be some fundamental difficulties with the idea that there can be a purely factual-causal element of liability. The basic trouble is that the obstacles to a good philosophical account of causation also turn out to be obstacles to developing a universally applicable legal test for causation. The law gets round the obstacles by applying different tests in different circumstances, along with a healthy dose of common sense. While this may be a perfectly acceptable procedure in legal practice, it undermines purism about the factual causation element of liability, because the law retains a central role in determining which test is to be applied. This second worry is therefore linked to the first: it arises because we do not have an unproblematic analysis of, or test for, causation, meaning that the law has to step in to make up for the deficiencies. So however much we might feel inclined to insist that causal facts do not depend on our human laws, satisfaction of the cause-in-fact element of legal liability nevertheless does depend on our laws: and in this sense, it is never a purely factual matter. In particular, such a response requires that a given effect would be different -even if ever so slightly -had it had a different cause from the one it actually had. As a fully general proposition, this is false. If I press the button which arms my alarm clock, not knowing that my wife has already pressed it, then my press is not a cause of the alarm going off the next morning. The circuits were already connected; my press just moved some bits of plastic inside the clock. But the time and manner of the alarm's going off -at 7am, loudly -are just as they would have been had my wife not pressed and had my press instead been the cause. That is rather the point of alarm clocks.
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The inadequacy of the but-for test in cases of causal redundancy illustrates how satisfaction of the factual causation element of liability is not a purely factual matter.
Faced with a case of causal redundancy, what is a court to do? Obviously, set aside the but-for test, and decide on some other basis whether a causal nexus exists. What this shows is that the decision to employ the but-for test, or any other test, for factual causation, is a legal decision.
That this is a legal decision is borne out by the leading authority on causation in
English tort law at time of writing, 10 which lays down guidelines on the circumstances in which the approaches to situations presenting conceptual or evidential difficulties for the proof of causation ought to be applied. 11 The existence of such an authority (as well as its content) suggests that it is a matter of law which test ought to be used to This line of thought receives support from contemporary philosophical approaches to causation. It is widely accepted among philosophers that there is a "fundamental notion" of causation, even if in casual talk we usually restrict our attention to those causes in which we are interested for whatever explanatory, moral, or indeed legal purposes we might have. According to this widely held view, as far the fundamental notion goes, this selective activity amounts to "invidious discrimination" 14 which we have "philosophically speaking, no right" to make. 15, 16 This distinction is a close parallel of the distinction in law between factual and legal causation. Just because we can't exactly say what this fundamental notion of causation amounts to, the argument goes, it hardly follows that we should abandon it altogether. Likewise, just because we cannot devise a legal test for factual causation, it hardly follows that we should abandon any factual element in the causal inquiry. It only shows that we need to be conscious of the limitations of our legal tests.
However, there are two obstacles to legal theory simply adopting the assertive stance of the philosophers. First, as H.L.A. Hart and Tony Honoré argue, the law needs to answer to common sense in a way which philosophers -rightly or wrongly -seem not to feel they need to. The concept of causation which the law uses and applies is derived from common sense, and ultimately answers to common sense. This "shared concept" claim is extremely plausible, 17 provided it is not understood as the obviously false claim that the causal judgements made by common sense are exactly those made by law, and vice versa. The claim, rather, is that common sense and legal judgements
about causation apply what is broadly the same concept, even if the legal application of that concept becomes technical. Another way to put the point is that, whatever the technicalities, the subject remains recognisable as pertaining to what we would ordinarily call causation. To that extent, the law and common sense share a concept of causation, and anyone who denies it must provide a better explanation of the curious fact that the law uses the ordinary word "cause".
That causal judgements in law answer to common sense presents a special difficulty for legal theorists who wish to cite this orthodox philosophical view of causation in since every one of them fails to mention all the but-fors of the effect in question (through ignorance if nothing else). We could insist that every causal claim of the form "X is the cause of Y" is strictly speaking false, and means merely that X is an especially salient cause of Y for present purposes. But this interpretation is imposed on, not suggested by, common sense and talk.
A related point is that taking a purely factual notion of causation as conceptually prior is misguided, with regard to our ordinary use of causal concepts. Normally, when we say of an event that it is the cause, we regard it as the cause from the start, and we may then come to learn more about the other causally relevant events. 18 The procedure advocated by the purist about factual causation in law is the opposite way round, however: first identifying causally relevant events, and then asking whether they amount to causes for present, legal purposes. This reversal of the order in which we commonly proceed threatens to undermine the common sense basis of legal judgements.
The second reason that legal theorists ought not adopt the assertive stance orthodox among philosophers is that there are philosophers who dispute the orthodoxy, and their point of dispute has special relevance to the law. Jonathan Schaffer, for example, points out that the extreme predictability of our supposedly invidious judgements about "the" cause amounts to "the sort of stable intuition that philosophers normally treat as data rather than rubbish". 19 He doubts whether it is possible to arrive at a satisfactory analysis of factual causation, stripped of selective judgements of explanatory, moral, legal, or other kinds of relevance. He writes, "…it is not obvious that we have any such concept… Or at least, it is not obvious that our intuitions about causation can provide any evidence concerning this 'broad and nondiscriminatory concept', if our intuitions are shot through with selection effects".
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This is a problem for a legal theorist who hopes to rely on a philosophical consensus, since there is no such consensus, even if there is a prevailing view. But more specifically, the reasons given by the dissenters are of particular concern from a legal perspective, if it is accepted that legal judgements about causation ultimately answer to common sense. If, as Schaffer claims, the common sense notion of causation is shot through with selection effects, then it is hard to see how a legal notion of factual causation, devoid of selection effects, could answer to the common sense notion. We might try to argue that but for Jane's drunkenness, the damage might still have occurred, because Jane could still have been walking, but sober. This is not a principled argument, however: we might just as well argue that but for the walking, the injury might still have occurred, because Jane could still have been drunk, but in the pub. The breach of duty consisted in doing both at once; and the but-for test gives a different result depending which we apply it to.
If, as I am assuming, we wish to find that Jane's being drunk on the highway is not a cause of her own injury and the damage to Richard's car, the proponent of the but-for test must hope that Jane's breach is not a cause in law. No doubt the court would find accordingly, but three points of dissatisfaction are worth noting. First, the doctrine of novus actus interveniens cannot readily be applied to the case. It is hard to see
Richard's swerve as a novus actus, breaking the chain of causation; after all, it occurred at the instant of the damage, and was indeed an essential part of the cause of the damage. More generally, the distinction between acts of third parties which follow naturally and therefore fail to be novus acta is suspect, as was noted in the forceful cause in fact clearly contradicts this common sense intuition; it does not answer, as it ought, to common sense. The role of common sense in this argument is not to require that every causal and common sense judgement agree. Rather, the point is that insistence on a legal doctrine of factual causation, to the extent that it comes at the expense of the common sense notion of causation, comes also at the expense of deserving the name "causation". Divorced of common sense, factual causation becomes a purely legal doctrine.
Legal causation
In the previous section, I suggested reasons why it might be desirable to allow what we might broadly call relevance considerations into the factual causation element of liability. In this section I make the complementary argument, that these relevance considerations are not satisfactorily handled as purely legal restrictions on the causal facts. The basic reason is the same: that considerations of causal relevance are integral to our causal judgements, meaning neither makes sense when they are separated.
Legal causation might be characterised broadly as a class of legal doctrines which limit liability once a causal nexus has been established. But this characterisation is vague; and worse, it is not sufficient. The law has many mechanisms for limiting liability among causes in fact. In tort law, all the other stages of establishing liability could be seen as satisfying this definition: the imposition of a duty, the question of whether the duty was breached, and the question of whether the claimant suffered damage. A defendant who causes harm but who does not owe a duty of care, or who owes a duty but meets the standard of care, is not liable for the damage she thereby causes. A defendant who owes and breaches a duty and causes some effect on the claimant that fails to be a recognised form of damage is not liable. It will not do, then, to characterise legal causation as a set of legal doctrines limiting liability among causes in fact; such a characterisation would make the entire question of liability for negligence apart from cause in fact a question of legal causation.
Perhaps a more hopeful approach would be to specify the sorts of limitations which legal causation seeks to impose on liability among causes in fact. Legal causation arguably provides an entry point for policy considerations, and probably also for straightforwardly moral considerations which have little to do with policy and more to do with the rights and wrongs of a particular case. On this approach, all of our judgements of causal relevance would be akin to policy or moral considerations. That is, they would all be explained as the operation of certain other principles, which are not strictly causal in character.
For an example of how this might work, take the doctrine of remoteness of damage, which is governed by reasonable foreseeability. 26 It is easy to identify a moral doctrine that remoteness of damage might be seen as instantiating. Consider the doctrine that ought implies can: there is no moral obligation on an agent to do something which the agent cannot do. And in order to be able avoid causing damage (other than by luck), you must be able to foresee it. Therefore an agent cannot be held morally responsible for unforeseeable damage (with some refinements to handle the crucial qualifier "reasonably" -itself a normative term). In this fashion, one aspect of 26 Ibid.
the doctrine of legal causation might be reduced to the operation of a principle of a quite different, non-causal sort, namely the moral principle that ought implies can.
The enormity of this reductive task ought not be underestimated, however. To take the particular example we have just toyed with, it is clear that the law does not always respect the moral ought-implies-can doctrine. For example, the law sometimes imposes a duty which defendants are unable to meet. 27 Therefore the operation of the ought-implies-can principle is not sufficient to explain remoteness of damage; for circumstances exist in which that moral principle can be defeated, and does not dictate the law. The point can be generalised. On this reductive strategy, every single application of legal causation would need to be fully accounted for by the operation of some other, non-causal principle. No doubt some applications of legal causation are pure policy. But reducing every doctrine under that large umbrella to policy, moral or other non-causal considerations is an enormous task. Moreover, as we have just seen in the case of ought-implies-can, for every principle which is advanced, it is possible that an exception from some other part of the law might be found, which would show that the principle alone is not explanatorily sufficient. The complex and exceptionridden nature of the English common law makes this a rather likely prospect.
A Contrastive Approach
I now propose an analysis of factual causation which acknowledges the role of the law, and thus allows a better distinction between matters of fact and matters of law in contrastive. Often, we do not ask simply "Why P?" We ask instead, "Why P rather than Q?" We ask, for example, why I arrived late rather than on time. And to answer a contrastive why-question, it is not enough to mention a cause of the fact, P. We must mention a causal difference between the fact, P, and the foil, Q. As Lipton puts it in his Difference Condition:
To explain why P rather than Q, we must cite a causal difference between P and not-Q, consisting of a cause of P and the absence of a corresponding event in the case of not-Q.
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We must mention, for example, a difference between my arriving late and on time.
Either way, I would have stepped through the door. An important feature of the contrastive approach to explanation is the way it handles the context sensitivity of explanation. To adapt Hart and Honoré's example, the wife explains the husband's stomach pain by the fact he ate parsnips for dinner; while the doctor explains it by the fact the man has a stomach ulcer. 30 The doctor and the wife need not be seen as disagreeing with each other, however, on the contrastive model.
They are merely asking and answering different questions. The wife's question is, "Why did my husband get stomach ache this evening, and not yesterday or on many previous days?" The difference is that this evening, he ate parsnips for dinner. -While the doctor's question is, "Why did this man get stomach ache, when many other men do not?" Eating parsnips is something that many other men sometimes do without getting stomach ache, so cannot explain this man's stomach ache; while a stomach ulcer is not something which many of those other, stomach-ache-free men have. Thus the doctor and the wife do not disagree; they are merely answering different questions.
Another feature of this model that I want to emphasise is the location of the distinction between objective (or factual) and subjective (or interest-relative) components of explanation. What counts as a good explanation depends, as we just saw, in part on who is asking, among other things. But surely it does not depend only on such things. It is, in part, an objective matter whether an explanation is satisfactory 30 Hart and Honoré, supra note___ at 35-6. or not; if you are late, you cannot say anything that comes into your head by way of excusing yourself, and point in your defence to the interest-relativity of explanation.
The contrastive model allows for both an objective and a subjective component of explanation. Explanation is subjective inasmuch as it is up to us what question to ask, and therefore what contrast to specify in our question. However, once a contrast is specified, it is a matter of objective fact whether a proposed answer satisfies the Difference Condition, and specifies a difference between the fact and the foil with which it is contrasted.
The handling of the objective/subjective distinction in the explanatory context is the key reason, as I see it, to seek to transpose a contrastive model to the causal inquiry in law. Our goal is to implement a clear distinction between matters of fact and matters of law. I have argued that the satisfaction of the element of liability called factual causation is not a purely factual matter. Therefore, if the fact/law distinction is to be preserved, that distinction must be identified within the scope of that element of liability. The contrastive approach suggests a precise way to make this distinction. In the explanatory context, it is a subjective matter what contrast is picked, but an objective matter whether a putative explanation satisfies the Difference Condition with respect to that contrast (whether it is a causal difference between fact and foil).
Likewise, a contrastive analysis of the fact/law distinction in the causal inquiry would make it a matter of law which contrast was legally appropriate, but a matter of fact whether the wrongful act in question amounted to a difference between the instant case and the legally appropriate foil where the harm does not occur.
That is the idea in outline, and this is the proposed analysis:
Contrastive Condition on Causation in Law:
For a defendant's breach of duty to satisfy the causal element of liability with respect to a given harm to the claimant, the breach must be a difference between the instant case, and the legally appropriate foil where the claimant did not suffer that harm.
The distinction between fact and law is crystal clear. It is a matter of fact whether the defendant's breach of duty is a difference as required between the instant case and the foil with which it is contrasted. But what contrast is appropriate -what foil we should set against the facts of our case -is a matter of law.
Let me illustrate how the contrastive approach is supposed to work using the imaginary example discussed previously. The cause of Jane's injury and the damage to Richard's car, for the purposes of the law, must be a difference between the instant case where this damage occurs, and the legally appropriate foil where it does not.
That foil is one in which Jane walks home, drunk and thus in breach of duty. Jane's breach of duty thus occurs in both fact and foil, so cannot be the cause of the injury, at least for legal purposes. Richard's swerve, however, does not occur in the legally appropriate foil where the damage is averted. Thus it is a difference between fact and foil, so satisfies the Contrastive Condition. contrasts, but it may explain why that need might have been overlooked. My argument, on the other hand, is that there is something wrong with the explicit structure of causal judgements, and that they can be fixed by giving them an explicitly contrastive structure. This brings me right up against the need for an account of the legally appropriate contrast. 34 32 Lipton, supra note___. 33 Schaffer, supra note___ at 345 Schaffer's theory differs from Lipton's, proposing "c rather that C* causes e rather than E*" as the underlying form of causal claims. Lipton's contrastive theory specifies a contrast for the effect only, however, which is then supposed to determine (or narrow down) the selection of the cause. 34 Contrastive accounts of explanation in the philosophy of science do not provide inspiration here either. Contrastive explanations are answers to contrastive whyquestions, and explaining why we ask the questions we do is "not part of providing a model of explanation, as that task has traditionally been construed" -Lipton, supra note___ at 46.
Since the foil is supposed to be legally appropriate, it would seem natural to seek a solution in other elements of liability, especially (in the context of negligence) to duty. In particular, I suggest we should ask of a candidate foil whether it just observation of the defendant's duty, or whether the foil requires the duty to be met in a particular way. Richard's lawyers (accusing Jane) will struggle with this question.
The foil they propose is one where Richard still breaches his duty, by swerving, but Jane meets her duty of care, by staying off the street in her drunken state. However, this foil requires more of Jane than that she merely observes her duty. She could equally have done that by drinking less, but being exactly where she actually was when Richard swerved off the road. So although Jane's breach is a difference between the foil proposed by Richard's team and the actual case, the foil proposed by Richard's team is not one in which Jane merely observes her duty, but one where she observes it in a particular way. The law does not require that Jane observe her duty in this particular way. Thus the foil is not legally appropriate for establishing that the breach of this duty caused the damage.
On the other hand, by not swerving, Richard would merely have met his duty to drive with due care and attention. He is not required to meet this duty in any particular way.
Thus the foil in which Richard does not swerve is legally appropriate, and Richard's swerve meets the Contrastive Condition.
(It might be objected that Richard could have met his duty by having an unexpected stroke five seconds before his swerve, and thus that the proposed foil does after all require him to observe his duty in a particular way -by remaining conscious and not having a stroke. But to introduce such a stroke is to depart from the facts of the case in a gratuitous way. So we must require that legally appropriate foils not depart gratuitously and frivolously from the facts of the case. We can develop Schaffer's line of analysis by applying my proposed Contrastive
Condition. The claim against the owners could only succeed if sending the ship to sea with an unlicensed pilot was a difference between the facts of the case and the legally appropriate foil. But the owners could have met their duty by ensuring their pilot was licensed before sending the ship to sea, or by not sending it to sea at all. For the plaintiffs to satisfy the Contrastive Condition, they would have to propose a foil in which the duty is observed by not sending the ship to sea. But the owners could have observed their duty in ways not covered by the plaintiffs' proposed foil, by hiring a licensed pilot. This way of observing the duty cannot be included in the plaintiffs' foil because there is no reason to suppose that this officer, licensed, or another licensed officer, would have been any more wakeful. The actual argument of the case appears to have turned on this point, which is consistent with the Contrastive Condition: had the plaintiffs' argument succeeded, that would have shown that their proposed foil did not pick and choose among ways for the defendants to meet their duty, and thus that it was legally appropriate and that the Contrastive Condition was satisfied. However, since there were ways for the defendants to meet their duty that cannot be included in the foil (without gratuitous departure from the facts), the foil does not contain a mere meeting of the defendant's duty. So the foil is not legally appropriate, and the plaintiffs fail to establish that the owners' breach of duty causes the damage, according to the Contrastive Condition.
The final point I want to make about the proposed Contrastive Condition is that it is a necessary and not a sufficient condition for a cause in fact. Establishing that an event is a difference between the fact and the foil is not enough to establish that it is the cause, for legal purposes. For example, among the differences between the case where Jane was injured and the hypothetical case where she was not, is a slightly greater heating of the tyres on Richard's car, due to increased friction with the road brought about by a sharp change of direction. This is not a serious drawback for the use of the Contrastive Condition. It is a difficult necessary condition to satisfy, and whatever other necessary conditions need satisfying are obvious enough in practice. Some differences between fact and foil will be eminently non-causal: for example, the triangles we would get if we drew straight lines between Richard, Jane and the pub at a time just after that at which the accident in fact occurred. Other differences will be causal but will not attract liability, such as the heating of the tyres. The tyres are not legal persons, so cannot be liable. More generally, the law can make formal stipulations about the burden of proof. The burden of showing that the defendant's action is a difference between the fact and the legally
